Introduction
Nowadays, many countries are confronted with an aging population. These changing demographic conditions raise challenges to ensure long-term adequacy of retirement benefits. It also raises questions on the sustainability of future public expenditures on pensions. These issues do not only concern future pension obligations of governments but may also be valid for private or personal pension schemes. In this respect it should be pointed out that pension systems can differ significantly across OECD countries.
This paper investigates how pension liabilities in the OECD area are reflected in published data on the OECD's website. The analysis is limited to international datasets as sent by the countries to the OECD. In comparing countries a number of differences come to the surface in relation to the statistical recording of pension liabilities. Divergences may be related to different national recording practices when interpreting and implementing the prescriptions laid down in the statistical handbooks. In addition, diverging recording practices may be the result of variations between national pension systems and internal accounting rules.
The impact of these variations are investigated.
The current international standards for the compilation of national accounts, the System of National Accounts (SNA) 1993, and its European equivalent, the European System of Accounts (ESA) 1995 only recognise pension liabilities to beneficiaries for private schemes that are funded, i.e. schemes that have accumulated funds for the payment of future pension benefits. 1 Only pension provisions that accumulate such funds or reserves represent holdings belonging to households. All other contingent or future liabilities in social security schemes, even when funded, or in private unfunded schemes are neither treated as household assets nor as liabilities of those schemes. To correct this incomplete coverage of employment related pensions, the recently revised standards, the 2008 SNA and the ESA2010, now recognise pension liabilities in core national accounts from all employment-related pension schemes to households, whether funded or not. Although social security pensions are not recognised as pension entitlements of households in the core accounts, they have to be included in a supplementary table. This table would then show a comprehensive picture of all social insurance pensions, and could be of great help to identify the total amount of pension liabilities. It will also improve the international comparability of national statistics on pensions. On the other hand, also the new standards still have a number of shortcomings which will be further elaborated upon.
1 The term private here may cause some confusion as it means not only funded and unfunded pension arrangements by private sector companies (including pension funds and insurers) but also schemes operated by the government as an employer.
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In table 1 the availability of data in the OECD datasets on pensions is presented in qualitative terms. In order to choose one indicator of pension liabilities as a starting point for international comparison, the table shows that most countries publish household pension assets in the NA-dataset (third column).
However, Canada and Germany do not have data here, while they do include estimates in HAL (although On the assets side most countries provide data to the OECD on AF.612; Italy's data for the database HAL over 2010 and 2011 still have to be published. As noted above, the United Kingdom does not report any data on pension entitlements of households. Figure 2 brings together pension entitlements of households according to the indicator HAL for which most countries publish data. Figure 2 shows that there are considerable differences across countries. A distinction can be made between two groups of countries, one with relatively low shares of net equity holdings, and another one with relatively high shares. In the first group (France, Portugal, Spain, Italy, Germany, Japan) the net equity to GDP ratio ranges from 9% in France to 43% in Japan. The second group of countries includes the US households owning pension equity in the range of 90% of GDP. It also includes Australia, Switzerland, the Netherlands, Canada and the United Kingdom (where the ratio of pension entitlements to GDP is as large as 152%). Section 3 will clarify the data of the United Kingdom on pension liabilities.
Pension entitlements in a dynamic perspective
Also in a dynamic perspective pension entitlements in the two groups of countries are different (figure 3).
Most of the countries in the second group show an upward trend until 2008. In that year, however, there is a sharp decline in the value of pension liabilities to households. For countries that rely (partly) on defined contribution (DC) pension systems (UK, US, Australia) this could be due to the stock market decline as a result of the economic and financial crisis that started with the collapse of Lehmann Brothers. As is well known, DC systems do not guarantee the amounts they will pay out in future. Instead, the results depend on the contributions made and the market returns on the invested funds.
For other countries that predominantly have defined benefit (DB) schemes (Canada, Netherlands, Switzerland), the sharp dip is slightly puzzling, at least at first sight. DB schemes more or less guarantee pension entitlements to participants, largely irrespective of financial market returns; the relevant pension entitlements mainly depend on the (average) compensation of employees and the number of years that one 
Comparing pension obligations across OECD countries
This section will highlight at least four reasons for differences in the ratio of pension entitlements and GDP. These will explain to some extent the variation shown in figure 2.
3 With the data 2010 revision due to ESA 2010 Dutch pension liabilities will be derived from reported obligations of pension funds to households instead of financial assets of the funds. 4 From 2014 Switzerland will use actuarial valuation of pension fund liabilities as this is required by ESA2010. 
Funded versus unfunded systems
The distinction between two groups of countries reflects a very important institutional difference, i.e.
whether or not the pension schemes are funded. This has a substantial statistical impact. The countries in the first group have a large first-pillar-state pension in common. They have PAYG schemes without accumulated assets, and the contingent liabilities of these PAYG schemes are not recorded. The countries in the second group have to a large extent funded pension systems; past contributions in excess of past benefit payments have been saved and accumulated into asset portfolios of pension funds. Together with property income and holding gains arising from these investments, a large stock of earmarked financial assets has been created. The second pillar is very important in the pension provisions of these countries.
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As only the funded liabilities are to be recorded according to the 1993 SNA, only these entitlements show up in statistics.
Discrepancy in national recording practices
Secondly, there may also be quite divergent recording practices across countries. The United Kingdom statistical authorities do not publish separate data on pension obligations as we have seen before (table 1) .
In fact, the data in figure 2 reflect not only net equity in pension funds but also net equity in (individual) life insurance. Only for this broader aggregate (SNA93: AF.61) official data are also available. Up to now, the United Kingdom has not made make a split between the two items. Traditionally, the British private sector is very large and insurance companies are playing a major role in pension provision. Insurance companies not only manage investments for their own risk, but also manage (individual) life insurance contracts. In addition, they take care of assets (and the relevant liabilities) of employment related pensions and of so-called self-administrated workplace pensions and trusteed funds. Although an official estimate of separate pension liabilities is not possible now, the Office of National Statistics (ONS) assumes that the majority of the liabilities falling under AF.61 are in the field of (collective) pension arrangements. 6 As a consequence, one can argue that the United Kingdom pension entitlements are substantial. However, it should be noted that the estimates for the pension entitlements to GDP ratio is overestimated due to inclusion of entitlements related to (individual) life insurance.
Germany includes reserves related to health insurance. These are non-pension social insurance benefits.
They amount to about 7% of GDP. Such reserves are an institutional feature of the German pension system and they rarely occur in other countries. SNA suggests including them only for pragmatic reasons in pension entitlements. 5 Although Canada's first pillar is funded as well, these funds are owned by the government and are therefore not included in the data on net equity of households. 6 Levy (2011 ). 7 SNA 2008 Within the group of countries with funded pension systems, the relevant data cover more differences in national practices.
In Australia government employees are covered by DB schemes. For a major part, these schemes are unfunded. According to SNA 1993, unfunded employer pension liabilities should not be recorded.
However, Australia has estimated these liabilities and they amount to 18% of GDP (end 2010 should be recorded according to SNA 1993. However, as these instruments do not seem to involve an insurance aspect, one could argue that they are to be recorded under the relevant financial instruments (e.g.
savings deposits).
In summary, recording practices across countries differ, as some countries (Australia, Canada) include unfunded or partially funded government employment related liabilities, while other countries (France, United Kingdom 10 ) do not. In addition, British households have substantial net equity in pension schemes.
They are statistically mixed with net equity in (individual) life insurance schemes. Further, Canada takes some pillar three personal pension plans on board, while other countries (The Netherlands, United States, Switzerland) do not. Moreover, The Netherlands and Switzerland disseminate pension funds' balance sheet totals instead of liabilities (par. 2.3). Finally, Germany includes some non-pension related reserves in the pension entitlements of households.
Varying pension formulas: DB versus DC
Another difference in the measurement of pension liabilities is that funded employment related pension schemes in various countries differ in their definition of pension benefits. Countries with accumulated assets for retirement do not use the same pension formula. Some rely mainly on DB types (The Netherlands), others have both DB and DC systems in place (Unites States). Also, some economies only rely on DC occupational schemes (France). 11 Figure 5 presents an overview of the various schemes, as derived from the OECD Global pension statistics. The shares of DC and DB pension assets may have far-reaching implications. First, the measurement of pension liabilities in DC schemes is quite straightforward. DC plans follow the market value of the underlying invested assets. And because in most countries pension providers apply fair value pricing, there will be less variation in valuation methods across DC pension schemes, and DC pension liabilities can be 11 Of course, the high DC share in e.g. Italy (91%) represents still a very small percentage of its GDP. Other countries without a tradition of DC schemes rely heavily on DB pension arrangements (Canada, Netherlands, Portugal, Switzerland, United Kingdom). More than 80% of employment related pension funds' assets in these countries are of the DB type. Pension liabilities in DB schemes are measured quite differently: benefits do not depend on investment returns but are set according to a formula that depends among others on earnings, age and career length. Because in DB schemes under-or overfunding is the rule rather than the exception, pension entitlements will not coincide with market value of funds' assets. This implies that within the group of countries with funded pension schemes, disparity in the composition of DB and DC elements might lead to sizable differences in measuring liabilities. In general, different pension formulas will generate divergent measurements of pension plans. Therefore, international comparison of these pension obligations needs to be considered with special care.
Discounting DB pension liabilities: variation in discount rates
The fourth source of variation in measuring pension obligations stems from the fact that DB schemes in OECD-countries do not use the same type of discount rate to arrive at the current value of future retirement benefits. Basically, two methods are used in practice when setting discount rates:
(1) actuarial method (2) fair value method
The first method fixes a pre-set expected rate of return on assets. This is motivated by the long-term orientation of pension funds. 12 Funds face a very long investment horizon, e.g. 60 years. In this period they could earn above-average returns in good times which would compensate for meagre years with low or even negative returns. This view has traditionally been taken by the actuarial profession. The method usually takes into account the rates of return that have been realised in the past. 13 For a long time pension liabilities had been valued using a fixed discount rate, based on an assessment of the long-term earning capacity of the assets held. 14 For instance, in the Netherlands a constant actuarial rate of 4% had been used until 2007.
However, this view has recently been criticised by economists. 15 They hold the view that an actuarial rate will only fully fund the scheme's liabilities if the assets indeed generate the expected yield in the next ten 12 Ponds et al. (2011) . 13 or twenty years. The actuarial view ignores that the funds' chosen asset allocation might result in different outcomes, including very bad outcomes. Bad outcomes may not be consistent with the highly certain nature of DB pension benefits. Therefore, in this view, which is founded in standard finance theory, future streams of payments should be discounted at a rate that reflects their risk. 16 A case can be made that DB pension promises appear almost risk-free; this may be true in case the public sector is providing these schemes (like in the United States, the United Kingdom or in Canada) which refer to accrued pension rights that workers have already earned. Consequently, if pension payments are quite certain to be made in the future, then the discount rate used should be a risk-free interest rate reflecting current market rates, like
Treasury bills or interest rate swap rates. In this way one enjoys the comfort that investments prevailing today will yield at least the same return, so as to guarantee the payment of future pension obligations. Even if the pension promise is less certain, it is argued that the use of current market-determined interest rates is still the preferred option, as current rates can be earned which is not necessarily the case with assumed rates. For this reason, the second method is also called the fair value method. It reflects the emergence of fair value accounting and mark-to-market valuation principles in the nineties of the last century. 17 The fair value method has been founded in US GAAP and IFRS accounting rules for private sector companies. Table 2 shows the variation in the use of discount rates across countries. It relates to countries that provide DB funded schemes. PAYG-schemes are not included, because at present they often do not disclose liabilities nor do they apply a discount rate. The sources for this table are mainly based on detailed reports available on the internet. It should be pointed out that public sector schemes do not always make clear which actuarial assumptions on discount rates are applied. Most certainly, it is less clear than in the case of private sector DB pension schemes, which typically use standardised fair value accounting assumptions.
Table 2 also shows that when the government sector is ultimately responsible for the operation of the pension schemes the actuarial method is typically applied. In all countries, this method is based on the expected return on assets that investment managers of these funds hope to achieve in the long run.
16 Novy-Marx & Rauh (2009) . 17 Ponds et al. (2011) . The outcome must lie between 3.5 -4.5%. 4 Due to privatisation of public sector employees' pension schemes in the 1990s funds' liabilities are now classified under private sector (financial institutions S.125). It is clear from table 2 that discount rates differ across countries. In this respect, it should also be noted that discount rates do not need to be the same for all economies. National inflation rates will vary across countries. Moreover, variations in discount rates may reflect different investment strategies and market views. Pension schemes have varying asset allocations which may affect the discount rates as a proxy for expected returns. In addition, member age profiles (does the scheme has younger or older members?) and life expectancy differ between countries.
What catches the eye in table 2 is that private sector plans' discount rates are systematically lower than those in the public sector plans. This difference in accounting practise clearly has significant consequences. Lower discount rates used in DB pension plans typically increase the net present value of the future pension obligations. Even small changes in underlying assumptions as regards the discount rate will have a significant impact. To illustrate this, figure 6 shows the impact of varying discount rates on unfunded pension entitlements in British social security pension schemes.
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Figure 6 Relative change in UK state pension entitlements due to changes in discount rate
Starting from a discount rate of 5%, a 1%-point increase will lead to a 21% decline in pension entitlements.
And a 1%-point decrease in the discount rate even adds 31% to pension entitlements.
For some public sector retirement plans in Canada, the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia it has been found that liabilities seem to be understated because they use too high (assumed) discount rates.
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18 Levy (2012) . 19 Ponds et al. (2011) .  high quality government bonds of a basket of several European countries to obtain a proxy for a risk-free rate;
 long maturities, i.e. at least 10 years;
 to be used for all government managed pension plans (including social security schemes);
 stable rate to avoid 'noise' from frequent changes;
 should be reviewed regularly because of uncertainty about future rate developments.
Surprisingly, the TCG goes even further and recommends that the same discount rate should be applied to all EU-countries. Preferably the Guide advises a rate of 3% in real terms and 5% in nominal terms, the difference being in line with the ECB´s medium-term inflation objective of a stable inflation rate of 2%. This specific discount rate is based on an historical average of 10 years government bonds in the eurozone and in Germany in 1999-2009. 30 3. Life expectancy: demographic assumptions based on the latest projections of Eurostat.
26 Eurostat/ECB (2009), p. 16 . This measurement concept is known as accrued-to-date liabilities (it reflects the accrued pension rights) and is applied in national accounts. 27 ESA 2010 p. 420. 28 http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/techn_comp_gd_pens_dt_nat_accts_201201en.pdf 29 The other approach, Accumulated Benefit Obligations (ABO), rules out real wage increases. 30 The TCG realises that the choice of the wage rate and the discount rate are related to each other.
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As stated before, the choice of the discount rate is a key assumption because estimates of pension entitlements are very sensitive to even small changes. The recommendation of the TCG to use one, invariable, discount rate for all EU-countries' public sector pension schemes generates some problems.
Firstly, one rate for all can be misleading if national inflation rates differ (as they do within the EU).
Secondly, one constant rate seems to suggest that the actuarial method with expected (but perhaps not attainable) returns for discounting future pension obligations is applied, instead of the fair value method that uses current market prices. Thirdly, applying one rate for all assumes that the degree of certainty of future pensions in public sector DB pension plans across the EU is the same. In reality, however, DB pension schemes between EU-countries differ in the 'strength' of the pension promise. Some schemes specify strong promises, others contain soft entitlements. As a result, for countries with low inflation and strong nominal pension promises a discount rate of 5% will be too high, and for other economies it will be too low. This will result in underestimating pension liabilities in the first group and overestimating them in the second group of countries. (table 3) . In compiling these estimates countries applied the accrued-to-date liability concept. The results are only indicative as in many cases they need to be further developed. In the upper section A pension entitlements for government employees' unfunded schemes are estimated. In the lower section B obligations for social security pension schemes are calculated.
As can be seen, entitlements using PBO are larger, as under this approach real wage growth is assumed. In the ABO approach pension entitlements only increase in accordance with future inflation. Diverging assumptions on the developments of real wages between countries can also be a source which may create problems for the international comparability of data.
31 It should be added that one discount rate serves a baseline scenario. Countries are invited to run a sensitivity test with several interest rates. 32 Eurostat/ECB (2008) . Figure 7 shows that for the six economies to the right of Canada social security obligations are especially large for countries with a PAYG-system where the government takes care of pensions. In most countries (Germany, Khurmi et al. (2010) . Australia operates social assistance for aged people, which is available to the general public, on a means tested basis and where beneficiary contributions are not a criterion for eligibility. More in general, figure 7 clearly shows that including unfunded liabilities results in a totally different picture than the one presented in figure 2 . France, Germany, Portugal and Spain have made large (unfunded) government pension promises to its population. In terms of net pension equity to GDP they surpass the Netherlands. The already high ratio of pension entitlements to GDP in the United Kingdom increases even more.
Conclusions
The goal of introducing the supplementary table on pensions in SNA 2008 was to generate comparable estimates for pension entitlements across countries. Doing so, the European Union (EU) also tries to harmonise some of the accounting assumptions to be applied. This effort to foster international comparison can only be applauded.
Completion of the supplementary table will solve the problem of the differences in the treatment of funded and unfunded pension systems, as a consequence of which more transparency of pillar one and pillar two accrued pension liabilities can be achieved. Furthermore, the idea of harmonising accounting assumptions in public sector pension schemes in the EU is a step forward too. As a result, public sector schemes inside countries, but also across countries, can be better compared. However, applying one and the same discount rate for all EU-countries seems to be an over-harmonisation, as it will lead to under-and overestimation of social insurance pension liabilities. A final advantage of the supplementary table will be the provision of a comprehensive picture of all social insurance pension schemes.
On the other hand however, some national reporting practises that deviate from statistical handbooks and questionnaire guidelines will of course continue to show up in the supplementary 
